


AD-A258 359

2



AIR WAR COLLEGE

Research Report

SERVANTS IN THE STORM

DTIC
ELECTE
DEC 24 1992
S C D

JOHN R. BLAIR


LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF

and

H. BRIAN HIGHFILL

LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF

1992



92-32693



12 12 23 059

Air University
United States Air Force
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

Approved For Public
Release: Distribution Unlimited

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

SERVANTS IN THE STORM

by

John R. Blair
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

H. Brian Highfill
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM

REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Chaplain, Colonel Albert A. Hockaday

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

MAY 1992

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Avail and/or	
Dist	Special
A-1	

DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily reflect official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (telephone [205] 953-7223 or DSN 473-7223)

ABSTRACT

TITLE: Servants In The Storm

AUTHORS: John R. Blair, Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
H. Brian Highfill, Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Air Force Chaplain Service contributions during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm are many, varied, and unsung. Chaplain Service personnel provided for the spiritual needs of the troops, which positively impacted their morale to support and sustain air combat operations during the Gulf War. Several key factors drove this accomplishment: leadership, logistics and material support, pastoral ministry team (PMT), and contingency hospital support. A new model of ministry called the PMT was employed. This was the first real test of the PMT model in a wartime environment.

This paper investigates how the PMT model of ministry enhanced and multiplied the efforts of the Chaplain Service personnel who ministered to the needs of those serving in the Gulf War. Additional focus is directed toward unique Gulf War experiences for the Chaplain Service. The Chaplain Service will be challenged to provide regional and global ministry based on the lessons learned from Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the changing world environment, and joint military operations in support of the new United States National Military Strategy.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Blair has been an Air Force chaplain since March, 1977. He graduated from Baker University, Baldwin, Kansas, with a B. S. in Speech in 1973 and holds a Master of Divinity from the Interdenominational Theological Center in Atlanta, Georgia. Over Chaplain Blair's career, he served as Senior Protestant Chaplain, Chief of Base Support Division, program manager for the multi-command Adult Value Education Program and managed mobility and readiness for chaplain function personnel. Additionally, he has advised commanders on religion, ethical concerns, and the quality of life. He attended Academic Instructor School in 1980 and completed Air Command and Staff College by correspondence in 1986. Previous assignment was Installation Staff Chaplain, Kunsan Air Base, Korea. He is currently attending the Air War College Class of 1992, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

Chaplain, Lieutenant Colonel H. Brian Highfill (Masters of Divinity, Notre Dame, New Orleans, Louisiana) has been an active duty Catholic chaplain in the Air Force since 1980. He was ordained a Roman Catholic Priest for the Archdiocese of New Orleans, Louisiana on May 11, 1974. Following ordination he served as the full-time Director of the Radio and Television apostolate for the Archdiocese of New Orleans, hosting, producing, and directing numerous weekly radio and television programs. He has also produced documentaries for national distribution. His active duty assignments have included Lackland AFB, Texas; Shaw AFB, South Carolina; Orlando AFB, Florida; Diyarbakir AS, Turkey; Minot AFB, North Dakota; Incirlik AB, Turkey; England AFB, Louisiana; Bitburg AB, Germany; Edwards AFB, California; Langley AFB, Virginia; and is currently attending the Air War College Class of 1992, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Following graduation from the Air War College, he will be assigned to San Vito AB, Italy, as the Senior Chaplain.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
DISCLAIMER	ii
ABSTRACT	iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES	iv
 Chapter	
I INTRODUCTION	1
II LEADERSHIP	4
III LOGISTICS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT	7
IV. PASTORAL MINISTRY TEAM	9
V. CONTINGENCY HOSPITAL TEAM	17
VI UNIQUE GULF WAR EXPERIENCES FOR THE CHAPLAIN SERVICE	20
VII COMMENTS FROM PMTS DEPLOYED IN THE AOR	23
VIII. CONCLUSIONS	29
IX LIST OF REFERENCES	34

INTRODUCTION

"The soldier's heart, the soldier's spirit, and the soldier's soul are everything. Unless the soldier's soul sustains him he cannot be relied on and will fail himself and his commander and his country in the end. It is morale that wins victory."¹

General George C. Marshall

The primary mission of the Chaplain Service in wartime is threefold: to nurture the living, to provide spiritual care for casualties, and to honor the dead. As such, the Air Force Chaplain Service (Morale Officers, Spiritual Advisors and "AL RAI 'E" (Arabic word meaning Shepherd, Guardian, Patron or Pastor)) can truly be proud of the superb job performed during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm to support and sustain air combat operations in response to Iraqi aggression in the Gulf War. President George Bush said of Desert Storm, "Our victory also showed that technology alone is insufficient. A warrior's heart must burn with the will to fight. And if he fights but does not believe, no technology in the world can save him. We and our allies had more than superior weapons; we had the will to fight."²

Chaplain Service personnel ministered in many ways to the troops in the Gulf. They provided a plethora of worship services, visitations, pastoral care, counseling, Bible studies, prayers, religious rites, and many other ministries. The chaplains built esprit de corps and morale within the largest deployment of United States military forces since the Vietnam War. This accomplishment demonstrated visionary leadership by the Air Force Chaplain Service.

Additionally, the war effort allowed the application of the readiness ministry training of the 1980's. When President George Bush ordered American military forces to defend Saudi Arabia, Chaplain Service personnel were challenged to demonstrate readiness ministry in a desert 8,500 miles from the Continental United States. Deploying to a harsh, barren, bare base desert environment, the Chaplain Service personnel faced the daunting challenge of planning and providing ministry with temperatures that ranged from 115 degrees to 130 degrees Fahrenheit! Upon arrival to the Area of Responsibility (AOR), the Chaplain Service personnel needed to adapt to ten hour time differences, depending upon their point of origin in CONUS, and establish operational functions within the AOR. In some instances, Chaplain Service personnel were deployed to bare desert bases where they were confronted with austere living and severe working conditions. In the midst of anticipated combat operations during the defensive phase of the operation, anxiety was high as was a strong sense of urgency to provide the troops with round-the-clock quality ministry.

The principle purpose of this paper is to investigate, analyze, and document the ministry of the Chaplain Service during the Gulf War; and the secondary focus of this paper will be lessons learned for future wartime ministry operations.

The sources of information for this paper include the following: Chaplain Service personnel after action reports, interviews with chaplains and enlisted Chaplain Service personnel assigned to the AOR, reflections from operational unit commanders who were assigned to the AOR and are currently attending the Air

War College Class of 1992, Air War College curriculum material, various guest speakers at the Air War College, and seminar interaction among the members of the Air War College Class of 1992. In order to assess how the Chaplain Service effectively accomplished its wartime mission, this research paper will be divided into the following chapters: Leadership, Logistics and Material Support, Pastoral Ministry Team, Contingency Hospital Support, Unique Gulf War Experiences for the Chaplain Service, Comments from PMTs in the AOR, and Conclusions.

A key element of any military organization is leadership. We now focus our attention on the role of leadership. It was leadership that enabled deployed Chaplain Service personnel to effectively minister as "servants in the storm."

CHAPTER II

LEADERSHIP

The success of Chaplain Service Ministries in Desert Shield/Desert Storm was due largely to highly competent leadership. Leadership was the key factor. Without the strategic leadership provided by Headquarters, United States Air Force/HC (Chief of Chaplains Office), USCENTAF/HC Rear (Langley AFB, VA), USCENTAF/HC Forward (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), supporting MAJCOM/HCs, and Chaplain Service field operating agencies (FOA), initial operations would not have succeeded. The Air Force Chief of Chaplains's Office provided guidance, policy, resources, and coordination to the operational level of the chaplain function. In addition, the capstone effort was the staff visit to the AOR by the Chief of Chaplains. Also, USCENTAF/HC Rear had the primary role of tasking personnel, sourcing plans, manning the HC position on the Battle Staff twenty-four hours a day, as well as coordinating and monitoring overall Chaplain Service support requirements. The USCENTAF/HC forward was the principal advisor to USCENTAF/CC forward (Lieutenant General Charles Horner) for the following: religious matters, ethical concerns, supervising Air Force Chaplain Service personnel within the AOR, establishing operational policy, conducting required training, and conducting staff visits to 23 sites. During this time, MAJCOM/HCs were supporting required personnel taskings needed within the AOR contingency hospitals and for logistical support. The Air Force Chaplain Resource Board provided the following: resource books, sermon aids, Bibles, hymn players,

Chaplain Service DSN Directories, UPDATE, and other religious literature. Lastly, the FOA's chaplain leadership functioned in the role of providing personnel support in the AOR and to back-fill CONUS base vacancies. The task was immense. What proved to be most significant was the ability of senior chaplain leadership translating requirements into a wartime readiness ministry in support of national and military objectives during the Gulf War. On the morning of 15 January, 1991, the staff chaplain on duty at the USCENTAF Rear Battle Staff requested an opportunity to read aloud a scripture and to offer a prayer for the troops in the Gulf and for the Battle Staff. The scripture read was: "Be merciful to me, O God, be merciful to me, for in you my soul takes refuge, and in the shadow of your wings I will take refuge until the destroying storms pass by." (Psalms 57:1).³

In Operation Desert Shield/Storm the Air Force Chaplain Service leadership was challenged to provide the men and women of the United States Air Force with the best possible spiritual care. Leadership is vital in guiding an organization through a period of crisis response in the execution and accomplishment of its mission. Leadership is defined here as the ability to organize, persuade, encourage creativity, and draw others toward a common purpose.

Essential to carrying out the strategy of military leadership are the required resources which enable the fighting force to perform its wartime mission. Crucial to executing the orders of leadership are the necessary means of deploying to an AOR and then the ability to sustain that fighting force within an AOR. This

is the mission of logistics with its related counterpart, material support. We now turn to the importance of establishing and sustaining such a vital network of supply and resupply.

CHAPTER III

LOGISTICS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT

Prior to Operation Desert Shield, the assumption was that logistics was organized and planned in order to support operational plans in response to a general war fought in Central Europe. A logistical infrastructure was in place which could sustain a wartime operation beyond a thirty-day period of time.

With Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the President of the United States determined that U. S. forces would be deployed to defend the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. The strategy was to deploy needed war materials as rapidly as possible. This meant that Chaplain Service logistics support planning was organized around deploying to main bases, co-located bases, and some bare bases in response to a war in Europe. Many of the Chaplain Service personnel after action reports from the AOR reported insufficient supplies and an inability to replenish exhausted resources following thirty days on station within the AOR. Deployed Chaplain Service personnel soon discovered the inadequacy of a thirty-day supply of ministry materials. Of particular note, almost every after action report stressed the need for such items as: laptop computers, portable computer printers, VCRs with monitors, hand-held mobile two-way radios, hymn players with prerecorded religious music, key board players, guitars, sufficient supplies of Bibles and communion cups, public address systems that could play prerecorded cassette tapes, and refrigerators to keep communion elements and other worship supplies from spoiling. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

demonstrated the short falls that Chaplain Service personnel experienced when deploying with only thirty days of supplies.

In time, logistical and material support was initiated which met the requirements of Chaplain Service personnel deployed within the AOR. This meant satisfying the needs of the logistical customer. We now shift focus on how logistics fueled the primary vehicle utilized by Chaplain Service personnel within the AOR in order to perform ministry, the PMT.

CHAPTER IV

PASTORAL MINISTRY TEAM

"The primary mission of the pastoral ministry team is to provide spiritual support, solace, and ministry to combatants and combat support personnel. The unique mission of this team in combat is: (a) to nurture the living, (b) to provide spiritual care for casualties, and (c) to honor the dead. This threefold mission corresponds closely to the three phases of battle (pre-battle, battle, and post-battle). Enlisted chaplain service support personnel participation is absolutely essential, to provide support for religious services, programs and activities, manage equipment and materials, provide security for resources and personnel, serve as point of contact/liaison, procure communication instruments, manage information, arrange transportation, perform administrative requirements, provide crisis intervention in the absence of a chaplain, coordinate with medical personnel treating the wounded, and establish opportunities for honoring the dead. This support allows the ministry team to conduct continuous operations and enables the chaplain to devote maximum energy to chaplain-unique religious duties."⁴

In a wartime scenario, the environment of the Chaplain Service personnel in the field is one of uncertainty and confusion. Carl Von Clausewitz, a noted theorist of war, referred to this as the "fog and friction of war." In order to perform effective ministry in such an environment, the model best suited to accomplish this is the Pastoral Ministry Team (PMT). The concept of operation for the Chaplain Service to provide religious support during wartime is through the framework of the Pastoral Ministry Team. PMT has several meanings. PMT can mean the pairing of two chaplains or more in performing ministry. PMT can also mean pairing a chaplain and an enlisted chaplain support member as a team for

performing ministry. PMT can additionally refer to an entire chapel team as it performs ministry for a home base or at a deployed location.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm a key role of senior leadership was to identify and deploy PMTs to provide ministry to Air Force beddown locations and contingency hospitals. A wartime pastoral ministry team had to be developed. PMT's were tasked to cover six countries and respond to the needs of service members, especially in such critical areas as ministry of presence, pastoral care/counseling, and worship. Our peacetime deliberate planning had provided experience in building PMT support systems. The personnel and resources needed by the TAC Command Chaplains's Office in support of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm were provided by other MAJCOM/HC's Offices. During the crisis action phase, TAC/HC planned many different PMT support packages and provided Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) in response to needs within the AOR. As the operation plans were developed and revised, so were the PMT taskings. Exhausting hours were spent in the early days of the planning phase refining requirements and coordinating with HQ USAF/HC and other MAJCOM/HCs for chaplain support requirements.

Early in the decision making process, PMTs were deployed by other MAJCOMs to provide religious support for their respective units within the AOR. An initial PMT was deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia to serve on the USCENTAF Forward/CC Staff. Its mission was: (1) to serve on Lieutenant General Charles Horner's staff, (2) to interface with the USCENTCOM chaplain, (3) to oversee the ministry within the AOR, and (4) to interface with USCENTAF Rear/HC.⁵ The

first task for the USCENTAF/HC was to establish C3 (Command, Control, and Communications), obtain office space, equipment, transportation, and establish secure communications (using STU 3 telephones).

Before continuing the development and implementation of the PMT model, let us briefly review some important world factors which have necessitated the establishment of the PMT model. Since the end of the Cold War, a new world order has emerged. This new world order puzzles and challenges even the most insightful and gifted world leaders. Gone are the days when the United States Armed Forces can act as the world's policeman. With today's limited resources, we no longer are capable of attempting such an immense undertaking. Today and in the future, our military is being challenged to respond to regional crises worldwide at a moment's notice in the defense of our national interests and our national security. With the almost daily emergence of new threats to world order, as well as ongoing threats to our national interests and national security, the Chaplain Service will be challenged as never before. The new world order will require the Chaplain Service to perform ministry for our military personnel in a world filled with both opportunities and grave dangers. In order to meet and master the present and future challenges that will confront our Chaplain Service, a paradigm shift is mandated. Chaplain Service personnel will effectively meet present and future requirements through the implementation of the PMT model of ministry.

Although the PMT model was being taught prior to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the Persian Gulf crisis quickly thrust the PMT into reality for

most of our deployed Chaplain Service personnel. The war represented the first major test of the Chaplain Service wartime doctrine using the PMT model. Within the AOR were 23 bases supported by a host of chaplains and enlisted chaplain support personnel. The PMT empowered deployed Chaplain Service personnel with the capability and flexibility of providing ministry on a broad spectrum basis.

After-action reports from deployed Chaplain Service personnel within the AOR indicated that the PMT model proved to be a means to a more effective ministry. The majority of comments reflected that the PMT model enabled the PMT members to minister to more people. Our research indicates that the more successful PMTs were those teams which had received training as well as having practiced the PMT model prior to their being deployed. Conversely, those personnel who arrived in the AOR without previous training and experience with the PMT model were less effective and had to use the "crawl, walk and run approach." In time, those Chaplain Service personnel who mastered the PMT model soon experienced the synergistic dynamics that the PMT model fosters. Essential qualities that our respondents noted that made the PMT model the most rewarding and productive consisted of the following elements: (1) a clear sense of purpose, (2) effective communication, (3) roles being clearly defined and understood by each member, (4) mutual trust, and (5) a commitment by each team member to make the model work.

Global Reach/Global Power have today imposed upon the Chaplain Service a requirement for a greater state of creativity, flexibility and readiness with respect to ministry. Today and in the future, we will be called upon to deploy and

minister to service personnel deployed over night into areas of regional conflicts. Ministry in this new world order will require far more of us than our all too familiar past forty year model of parish centered ministry. The most effective way for the Chaplain Service to exercise its mission of spiritual support will now be through the use of the PMT model.

No where has this lesson been more forcefully learned than through both our successes and failures during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The deployed Chaplain Service personnel sent into the AOR that adapted to the PMT model not only performed outstanding ministry, they actually experienced the fruits of their long hours of labor multiplied a hundredfold! Those deployed Chaplain Service personnel that were not able to adapt to the PMT model of ministry soon discovered the fruits of disharmony and disunity. The adage that "we either hang together or hang separately" was painfully learned by some of the deployed Chaplain Service personnel within the AOR. Some of them experienced difficulty in functioning within the PMT model for some of the following reasons: (1) lack of training, (2) unwillingness to adapt to the PMT model, and (3) role confusion. The uncertainties which confront our present day military in the Global Reach/Global Power environment require our chaplaincy to expand its understanding of what it means to minister. The present requirement for ministry within the Global Power/Global Reach environment requires us to augment the traditional roles of the military chaplaincy. When we are called upon to confront future regional contingency requirements, the PMT model will best facilitate field ministry. For this reason, Chaplain Service personnel must understand, train, and

put into practice the requirements of the PMT model. Of particular importance is the need to understand that the PMT is more than the pairing of a chaplain with an enlisted chaplain assistant counterpart. The PMT is also an entire chapel team whether at home base or at a deployed location.

To be functional, the PMT model must be taught and practiced at the home duty station prior to any deployment. The PMT model is more than just a wartime mode of operation. The PMT model is the paradigm shift which will enable the Chaplain Service to transition into the future needs of ministry to our active duty forces and their dependents. A transition as radical as this will demand rethinking on the part of all Chaplain Service personnel. The Chaplain Service needs to modify and transition from the way it performed ministry during the Cold War era into the new requirements for ministry mandated by Global Power/Global Reach. Chaplain Service personnel should no longer expect to see the chaplaincy performing ministry in a "business as usual" manner. Ministry in the 90s and beyond will require Chaplain Service personnel to tailor their ministry around the elements of flexibility and deployability. They will need to practice ministry that responds to the needs of those who will be ordered at a moments notice to "come as you are" in response to regional conflicts and unplanned for world crises.

Pouring new wine in old wine skins poses many problems. The Gulf War validated the effectiveness of the PMT model. Regional contingencies like the Gulf War will be the future scenarios our military forces will be called upon to confront. The PMT model is worth the effort required to make it work. A

conscious effort must be made in forging the key ingredient which makes the PMT model function. The core of the PMT's uniqueness requires the development of professional and caring relationships among chaplains and their enlisted counterparts.

On June 1, 1992, the establishment of two new Air Force commands becomes a reality. It is therefore crucial that the Chaplain Service adapt to the requirements which the June 1st reorganization will place upon our active duty Air Forces. A new day is dawning which demands change in the way we will perform ministry for the 90s and on into the next century. The PMT model is the best means of meeting those unique requirements for ministry in a new world order. The new world that is taking form before our eyes will not be one that our nation will be able to dominate. With diminished national resources and diminished resources for our military services, our best strategy will be one of managing crises as they occur. With diminished national resources, U. S. military forces will no longer be able to afford the price required to dominate the outcome of regional conflicts. Future regional crises will require flexibility on the part of our active duty forces. The days ahead for our global community will likely be filled with many uncertainties and instabilities. Our present and future world environment demands that there be no "time outs" from readiness. Training is the glue which keeps the PMT viable and capable of responding to the demands of Global Power/Global Reach. The intellectual glue which keeps the PMT model dynamic is our doctrine for performing readiness ministry. The PMT model will enable the Chaplain Service to stay in the center of the court to effectively respond

to future challenges which will inevitably confront us. In summary, the motto for the PMT model needs to be memorized and recited frequently: "Practice makes perfect."

During the Gulf War, Chaplain Service personnel were called upon to provide ministry at contingency hospitals. These hospitals were established in order to bring healing to those wounded in battle. We will next examine the significant ministry which PMTs performed at contingency hospitals as servants in the storm.

CHAPTER V

CONTINGENCY HOSPITAL SUPPORT

The Chaplain Service contingency hospital ministry represents another example of exceptional religious support during the Gulf War. A total of 75 chaplains and 44 enlisted chaplain service support personnel met innumerable challenges never before experienced by the Chaplain Service, executing and operating with a mix of personnel from different MAJCOMs (ATC, SAC, and MAC). Additionally, with no chaplain representation on the medical Advon Team to these contingency hospital locations, logistical requirements had to be negotiated upon arrival at the sites. When President Bush deployed U. S. combat troops and warplanes to Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990, declaring "a line has been drawn in the sand," planners were estimating around 8 to 10 percent casualty rates could be anticipated when the shooting started. The Air Force Medical Service's contingency hospitals in USAFE and in the AOR became operational to provide medical care and healing for the warriors of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The chaplain team strategy was to establish rapport with each hospital commander. In turn, rapport was also established with all contingency hospital personnel in order to develop teamwork and become a key player in the mission of the contingency hospitals. The following comment was written by one of the class members of the Air War College Class of 1992 who was a hospital commander for one of the larger contingency hospitals:

The most significant contribution of the chaplains was the ministry to the medical staff as we worked side by side to provide medical and spiritual care to each and every patient when they were first admitted to the contingency hospital. The chaplains became a true source of reassurance, comfort, and a friend to me as the commander who can testify about how lonely it gets at the top.⁶

Chaplains were challenged to minister to medical personnel who faced tedium and boredom, the waiting for something to occur, hoping for a rotation policy in order to return home to loved ones, concern about family at home, and, in many instances, concern about skills going rusty for the lack of a wartime workload. Senior Chaplains at contingency hospitals worked cooperatively with hospital staff members to provide in-service training in such areas as triage, care of trauma victims, battle fatigue, and the needs of care givers. Given the inevitable "fog and friction" of crisis planning, there were a number of problems that senior leadership had to overcome -- but none of these problems were a "show stopper" that prevented the Chaplain Service personnel from accomplishing their objectives.

No single research paper could capture the herculean undertaking required to build chaplain support for contingency hospitals during the Gulf War. Many man hours went into the highly successful planning and execution of this capability by the Chaplain Service. This tasking required leadership, determination, equipment, time, and prayer. In addition to the roles PMTs performed in the AOR and at contingency hospitals, they also had to overcome other difficult barriers in order to provide ministry. We will next look at some of the restrictions and unique experiences which unexpectedly confronted Chaplain

Service personnel. We will examine what these unique experiences were and how Chaplain Service personnel responded to them with innovation and success as servants in the storm.

CHAPTER VI

UNIQUE GULF WAR EXPERIENCES FOR THE CHAPLAIN SERVICE

(1) The Gulf War was the first time in which religion played a key role in the overall planning of a battle campaign. The Chaplain Service was an active player with respect to advising senior commanders concerning important religious sensitivities, thereby averting religious strains with Moslem members of the coalition.

(2) This was the first U. S. war in which chaplains functioned under a command policy for the administration of religious support. When U. S. troops were deployed to the Arabian Peninsula, they found themselves in an area where Islam was the only officially sanctioned religion. *The rules of Islam determine the way one worships as well as the way one is required to live his or her life.* The King of Saudi Arabia is seen as the chief protector of Islam. He is required to ensure that any western troops brought in to defend his kingdom will not defile the mosques in Mecca and Medina, Islam's holiest shrines. Out of respect, and in order to avoid the perception of any disrespect toward Islam, a unique policy was established by USCENCOM. In order that U. S. personnel might practice their religious faith and observances, the following policy was enacted: (a) Faith specific religious symbols (including flags and pennants) will not be displayed out of doors, but may be discretely displayed indoors in areas not frequented by Moslems; (b) chaplains may wear chaplain insignia (cross or tablets) when in U. S. controlled areas, but chaplain insignia should not be worn when outside the U. S.

controlled areas; (c) religious articles and ecclesiastical supplies and equipment shipped through other than military airlift command channels will be marked for the morale officer; (d) formal worship services will be conducted only within covered shelters or private settings, and not in open areas or in the view of host nations; and (e) inter-faith ministry with local Moslem Imans is not permitted. Proselytizing in AOR nations is strictly forbidden under Islamic law. It subjects the proselytizer to severe criminal penalties.

(3) The Chaplain Service had time to build up the religious support capability for the war. Our adversary allowed the U. S. led coalition forces six months to marshal troops, equipment, material, and supplies in the AOR. This significant factor allowed the Chaplain Service leadership to overcome "system" inertia, personnel requirements, additional equipment, supplies, and conduct training to fine tune the massive religious support provided during Operation Desert Shield/Desert storm. Fortunately, the chaplaincy had the leadership and the time to build an unprecedented religious support operation.

(4) This was the first wartime deployment of female chaplains and female enlisted chaplain support personnel. Their task was complicated by the laws of Islam governing the role and conduct of women. In spite of the difficult limitations placed upon them, they were able to perform their tasks as ably and successfully as their male counterparts.

(5) Personnel deployed to the Gulf War were confronted with the unique circumstances of not knowing how long they would be deployed. During the Vietnam War, personnel knew that the standard tour length was 12 months and

that they would be returning home. This was not the case for personnel deployed in the Gulf War. With the absence of a rotation policy, many deployed personnel were anxiety filled with the holiday season approaching. Chaplain Service personnel in the AOR were inundated by numbers of personnel wanting to know when they would be rotated home to join families and loved ones. This necessitated a demand for the creation of special form of innovative ministry in order to address these very real concerns. When senior leadership determined that there would be a no-rotation policy, the Chaplain Service was challenged again to respond to the religious needs of those deployed in support of the war.

(6) With little exception, Chaplain Service personnel operating in the AOR were not able to purchase locally needed worship items such as alter wine, communion elements, and worship materials. This required ordering such items from the U. S., in turn it created a logistical delay in replenishment times. Often this created severe shortages of needed worship supplies. They were required to sustain their ministries without adequate worship supplies since these supplies did not exist within the host nation.

In spite of these handicaps, Chaplain Service personnel daily demonstrated their ability to improvise and to function. Our emphasis now shifts to a cross section of the Chaplain Service personnel who were performing ministry within the AOR during the Gulf War. The category selected for their comments is entitled "Comments From PMTs Deployed in the AOR."

CHAPTER VII

COMMENTS FROM PASTORAL MINISTRY TEAMS DEPLOYED IN THE AOR

"Freedom has a flavor that only the ones that have fought for it will ever taste."

AIC Matthew T. Muha
(MCP deployed to AIR 10 AUG 90).⁷

"A wise man learns from his experience; a wiser man learns from the experience of others."

Confucius

Throughout this section we will see a mixture of observations from both deployed chaplains and deployed Chaplain Service Enlisted personnel (also called CMPs). Many varied lessons were learned by our deployed Chaplain Service personnel during the Gulf War. We will now present a few of the insightful recommendations from both our Chaplain and Enlisted Chapel Support personnel who served within the AOR.

Comments concerning the Installation Staff Chaplain (ISC) and the Chief, Chapel support Activity (CCSA):

- Ensure that senior leadership goes to war. The ISC/CCSA should be the first ones deployed to set up the program along with the base commanders. Bringing a senior person in on top of a junior ISC who has been in place for two or three months, struggling to get a program going while ministering to an exhausted busy population, is bad medicine. The ISC/CCSA should be the first in and the last out. This is the price you pay for a leadership position.
- Identify the ISC prior to deployment. Make it clear who will be in charge. Designate caring and competent persons. Send the best

people into demanding situations. Commanders and deployed units are entitled to the best of our chaplains, accompanied by our best CPMs. Don't just mobilize junior chaplains or down-load questionable performers or persons with mediocre records from base level staffs.

- I learned that with a pastoral approach to problem solving (gentle voice and patient heart) nearly every difficulty could be resolved. Here is some worthwhile food for future deployments: Do not try to take a military approach by ordering people around or pulling rank. Remember, a gentle answer turns anger away!
- I know of persons who were redeployed to other locations in the AOR who worked hard but, due to negligence or laziness on the part of the ISC, they received neither LOE nor submission for an award or decoration. I feel this is an issue which needs to be addressed. Persons are being asked to work, submit after action reports, and their superiors don't think enough of them to submit them for an award when deserved.
- Our CCSA developed a PMT identification badge similar to the flightline badge. Above a colorful chaplain's seal, the words "Pastoral Ministry Team" were printed. Under the seal, the word "Chaplain" or "Chaplain Assistant" was printed. This helped enormously!

Comments concerning Chapel Management personnel (CMP):

- Many CMPs did not know how to support the chaplain outside of the chapel tent setting. Additionally, some CMPs were not confident in dealing with crisis or sensitive matters. Many CMPs found out that some people actually felt more comfortable talking with a CMP. This increased job satisfaction for those CMPs who were not afraid to become involved.
- We were not issued M-16 rifles once we arrived at our deployed location. You need to get them from your home base!
- A great deal of our ministry was mobile and we were constantly climbing in and out of cramped vehicles. Carrying the M-16 was awkward to the point of making it almost useless. Add to this the fact that all personnel at this location were required to carry chemical protective gear and the M-16 became a ridiculous burden. I strongly recommend that CMPs be trained in the use of sidearms and issued sidearms and ammunition at their home base. An enormous number of personnel at this location carried sidearms,

including cooks, doctor, medical technicians, public affairs personnel, and contracting personnel. I believe this would be a valuable addition to readiness.

- All CMPs should be required to be M-16 or sidearm qualified on a regularly scheduled basis whether or not they are on mobility.
- We had continuous problems with our CMPs being ordered to perform details. We were hampered by a directive which said, "it is recommended" that CMPs not be used for details." Clearly the language needs to be much stronger or we will continue to have this problem. The regulations must read: CMPs are not to be used as augmentees if the PMT model is to really function.
- Our combat support group commander considered us as doing nothing and thought that augmenting us for security police duties would give us something worthwhile to do.
- A tactic that our Intelligence shop devised was that when one of their personnel were augmented to security police duty, they immediately called CENTAF. CENTAF in turn called this command and said that if they did not need intelligence personnel as an intelligence asset, then they would consider that individual as excess and redeploy that individual somewhere else in the theater where they were needed. Following the call, the commander took the intelligence personnel off augmentee duty. This could be tried by the CENTAF/HC next time. Also, the ATH was able to protect their people. We should be able to do the same.

Comments concerning Chaplain Service personnel on mobility:

- Commanders need to have a better understanding of the PMT model!
- Lessons for the future must include a serious understanding that we could be at war at any time. Monetary, educational, comfort oriented concerns must come second. Chaplains and CMPs must be taught how to put their personal lives on "automatic." Debt payments, child care options, etc., must be seriously considered and realistic arrangements must be made so that Chaplain Service personnel will be able to deploy and function in a war zone on a moment's notice.
- I learned I can continue ministry even when my insides are tied in knots. I learned I am a leader. What I discovered about the ministry in wartime is that the rules changed. We, as an

organization, have failed to train properly for our wartime role. But I'm not sure how one goes about explaining war to people who have not yet experienced it.

- Ensure those on mobility are fit to do the job. This means being physically, mentally, and spiritually prepared at all times.
- There seem to be three reasons why this Chapel staff kept from burning out. They were people of faith with a good prayer life, they were very compatible and able to work together, and finally they kept physically fit.

Comments concerning deployed chapel needs:

- The ideal mobility chapel might take up several pallet positions. It would already include ample tents, altar, tables, chairs, office and altar supplies, enough for 90 or more days. Computers, printers, and software. Since items like tents, cots, etc., are likely to be appropriated by field commanders for billeting purposes, a system must be worked out similar to that followed by the Air Transportable Hospitals (ATHs) which will then insure that the chaplain has his facility and supplies at once and is ready to set up business at the deployed location.
- Bring some tools and learn how to use them before you deploy. Things like hammers, nails, saws, etc. There are a lot of crates associated with a deployment that have wood that could be used for bookshelves, altars, etc.
- We needed transformers to utilize our 110 volts chapel electrical items from the 220 volt current supplied by our host country.
- We requested three two-way radios with extra batteries and charger to allow emergency communications. After almost four months, we received two radios. These proved to be invaluable in responding to the mass casualty situation following an Iraqi SCUD attack on our area.
- The greatest need was for counseling space. We never could get a separate space for this purpose.

Comments concerning the PMT model:

- The next time we may not have six months to prepare for war and

our part of the mission. We have to be ready before leaving the airplane to support the people of the Air Force whenever and wherever they need us.

- Hand-held radios are essential. It is vitally important that commanders know that we need them and that they are provided for each PMT.
- Probably our greatest ministry was our outreach to the flyers during the war. We were with them from the beginning of mission briefings, praying at each briefing (at pilots' requests) and being present for all launches and recoveries. This really endeared us to all the pilots.
- It is important to respect the privacy of those living with you. We agreed on a list of family rules for our tent, including lights out time, use of tape players, noise level, etc. This clarified our expectations of each other.

Comments concerning miscellaneous suggestions for the future:

- Obtain a connex or similar structure for the chapel to use for storage at all deployment locations.
- Take slides or photographs at each location to document the ministry that is performed.
- Uniforms: Get them appropriate to the environment before CONUS departure. Two PMTs spent the entire time at the most dangerous Forward Operating Location dressed like trees when there wasn't a tree in sight. (Bang, You're dead!).
- From a MAJCOM/HC: I should have instituted a practice of calling each base twice a week to see how they were doing. It might have made a difference to the chapel staffs to know someone cares how they are doing.
- Keep a journal each day so reports can be made not depending on memory alone.
- We were able to assist our deployed personnel to view their home videos from family and loved ones in privacy through the use of our chapel VCR and monitor. This was a most welcomed ministry.

- The chapel offered a program called, "Better Than A Letter." This supplied people on the base with a 20-minute video tape that could be sent home. This was a huge success.
- Each deployed location could benefit tremendously by having a Broadman hymn player to enhance worship services!
- Another aspect of my ministry has been my involvement in the Alcoholics Anonymous program at my deployed location. I also provided copies of "LINK" and reunion material designed to prepare married individuals and others to properly cope with the complexities of reuniting with loved ones during our redeployment phase.
- I regretted not bringing more teaching and study materials!
- If you want it, bring it with you!
- Do not send mental health personnel home until you send the troops home first. The chaplain and the flight surgeon got inundated until someone decided to lead.
- The Chaplaincy needs to understand the mission needs of the USAF and not be self-absorbed. The chaplain is needed in the war zone. We could find ourselves not needed or not funded if we don't get with the mission statement and goals of those for whom we work.

The authors will now share how Chaplain Service personnel need to be prepared for future regional crisis. This will require innovative ministry. As was the case with Operation Desert Shield, it can be anticipated that future regional crises will require Chaplain Service personnel to deploy on a moment's notice in a "come as you are" status. We will next explore some important insights from Chaplain Service personnel who found themselves as "servants in the storm."

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

There are many salient lessons to be learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and perhaps the two most important lessons are: (1) not to learn the wrong lessons, and (2) to make sure we are not preparing to provide religious support based upon the requirements from previous wars rather than preparing for ministry which will be required for future wars. In an effort to avoid these errors, we will try to offer a few observations gleaned from our research, and offer some recommendations for global ministry to support the new U. S. National military strategy. The first observation is that the next time the U. S. Air Force is called upon to respond to regional conflicts, it will be a "come as you are" concept to fight the war. It is important to note that the U. S. will not have the long lead time afforded in Desert Shield/Desert Storm to build up the forces, equipment, and logistical support before the hostility begins. As such, Chaplain Service personnel deployed in support of future contingencies will have to insure they are organic enough to sustain their operations until a resupply capability is established. Second, the Gulf War demonstrated the continuing importance of technology. The Chaplaincy will need to exploit technology more as part of its strategy for future employment of ministry in a wartime environment. For example, technologies that make ministry more mobile, more flexible, and easier to support for the foreseeable future. Last, it is reasonable to expect future U. S. military contingencies to be joint, combined, operations with the command

structure and relationships organized similar to the one used in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. This is the type of environment the Chaplain Service will be called upon to perform ministry. It will become more critical than ever for the Chaplain Service to emphasize and participate in joint training to maximize its overall capability. In sum, the Air Force Chaplain Service will need to be fast on its feet, unbureaucratic, but more importantly, that we be farsighted.

The first recommendation we will propose will be developing a doctrine for the PMT model. The PMT concept is still evolving as the Chaplain Service strategy to provide effective ministry in wartime as well as in peacetime. One can readily find a number of definitions for doctrine, but for our purposes, doctrine is simply defined as what we believe about the best way to do business. Some of the principal functions of doctrine are to provide an important organizing function, serve as a guide, and guide the actual employment of forces in support of the mission. The following basic PMT doctrine is recommended as follows:

(1) Objective - Direct PMT ministry operation toward a defined objective(s) that contributes to the total team ministry. Once PMT objectives are developed, the objectives must be constantly reviewed to assure they reflect the overarching chaplain team mission.

(2) Unity of Effort - Ensure unity of effort for PMT ministry operations under one responsible senior chaplain. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be directed and coordinated to maximize ministry potential.

(3) Flexibility - The Chaplain Service is unique in that it is the only organization that deals with the spiritual needs of personnel. Because God is not

constrained, flexibility will be a must in PMTs achieving cohesiveness and ministry objectives.

(4) Priority - Priorities will need to be established to insure that resources are directed to vital areas of ministry needs. This will prevent trying to cover the waterfront thereby diluting time and resources on less important areas of ministry. Here the emphasis must be on quality rather than quantity.

(5) Simplicity - Develop simple, straight forward, understandable and meaningful ministry goals. Simplicity of plans, tasks, responsibilities, and instructions contribute towards effective ministry.

(6) Centers of Gravity for Ministry - Target key areas of ministry first to support maximum readiness and combat effectiveness of the troops. For example, some key ministries are: ministry of presence, pastoral care/counseling, and worship opportunities.

(7) Synergy - the synergistic benefits of performing ministry using the PMT model produce a multiplication effect as compared to the results achieved through the efforts of one person. In sum, the PMT model multiplies the effectiveness of pastoral ministry efforts.

(8) Centralized Control/Decentralized Execution - It is essential that specific goals be understood by all. Senior leadership must determine the strategy, priorities, and the objectives and in turn communicate them effectively and clearly to all team members. Decentralized execution empowers and allows subordinates to draw on their creativity and abilities in carrying out job requirements determined by senior leadership.

(9) Mobility - The ability to respond rapidly in providing religious support will be critical. To accomplish this, transportation, communication, and coordination are essential.

(10) Security - Ensure all security procedures are followed. Maintain positive measures to protect chaplain resources and ensure an effective and secure command, control, and communication network.

The PMT operational effectiveness during the Gulf War was successful, though it experienced some flaws, as noted in Chapter VIII of this paper. One of the ways Chaplain Service personnel will meet their global responsibilities for global ministry and master the challenges of the present and future will be through the development and implementation of a PMT doctrine. A doctrine that is clearly envisioned, clearly stated, clearly understood, and, put in action, will achieve these ends.

The wave of the future since Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm will be the requirement for all of our military branches to fight as a unified force. This will require the Chaplain Services of all branches to develop a doctrine of "joint ministry." There will likely be resistance toward implementing such a requirement. Perhaps the acronym "W.A.I.T.T." (which sounds like the word "weight") would be a fitting slogan for developing such a doctrine for joint inter-service ministry and cooperation. The acronym stands for: "We're All In This Together."

In conclusion, General Merrill A. McPeak, Chief of Staff, USAF, stated, "In the Nineties, the Air Force Chaplain Service will continue its pivotal mission of

helping Air Force people express religious beliefs. The story will not stop, but continue with the same mission: serving Air Force people in a worldwide setting."⁸ The contributions made by the "servants in the storm," their sacrifices and heroic efforts, as well as their lessons learned, will enable the Chaplaincy of the future to be able to provide ministry to troops deployed to any spot on the globe.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders Supplement, No. 5:22, May 1965.
2. Bush, George, "The Possibility of a New World order," Vital Speeches of the Day, No. 15, May 15, 1991, p. 450.
3. Bickers, Donald R, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm USCENTAF (REAR) BATTLE STAFF OPERATIONS REPORT, August 1990 - December 1991, March 1992, Langley AFB, Virginia, pp. 1-53.
4. War and Mobilization Plan, Volume I, Annex X Draft (Revised 16 SEP 91).
5. Bickers, Donald R, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm USCENTAF (REAR) BATTLE STAFF OPERATIONS REPORT, August 1990 - December 1991, March 1992, Langley AFB, Virginia, pp. .
6. Chaplain Support Desert Shield/Desert Storm Survey, April 1992, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
7. Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm Chaplain Service Personnel After Action Reports, Command Chaplains Office, Langley AFB, Virginia.
8. Groh, John E., Facilitators of the Free Exercise of Religion: Air Force Chaplains, 1981-1990, Office, Chief of Air Force Chaplains, Washington, D.C., 1991, p. ix.